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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Several factors can increase or decrease military-economic 
involvement in communist regimes. This anomalous form of 
military behavior, labeled as the Military Business Complex 
(MBC), emerged in various communist regimes in the 1980s. 
However, in the early 2000s, the communist governments of 
China and Vietnam began to decrease the number of 
military-managed industries, while similar industries 
increased in Cuba. This paper explains why military 
industries in Cuba have increased over the last two decades, 
while they decreased in the Chinese and Vietnamese 
examples. This question is answered by comparatively 
testing two hypotheses: the Communist Party and the 
Bureaucratic-Authoritarian (BA) Hypotheses.  
 
The Communist Party hypothesis helps explain how the 
historical and current structures of Party oversight of the 
military have been lacking in strength and reliability in 
Cuba, while they traditionally have been more robust in 
China and Vietnam. The BA hypothesis helps explain how, 
due to the lack of a strong civilian institutional oversight, the 
Cuban military has grown into a bureaucratic entity with 
many political officers holding autonomous positions of 
power, an outcome that is not prevalent in the Chinese and 
Vietnamese examples. Thus, with the establishment of a 
bureaucratic military government and with the absence of 
strong party oversight, the Cuban military has been able to 
protect its economic endeavors while the Chinese and 
Vietnamese MBC regimes have contracted.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Military Business Complex model (MBC) places the 
military apparatus in charge of economic and business 
dealings on behalf of the civilian communist authority. The 
Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was engaged in an 
MBC regime between 1978 and 1998. This included 
important businesses such as the Sanju (999) Enterprises 
Group, which began as a pharmaceutical oriented-
conglomerate but in the early 1990s expanded into real 
estate, investments and electronics, and the China Xinxing 
Group Corporation which specialized in many production 
industries such as civilian clothing and accessories.1 It was 
not until 1998 that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
under the presidency of Jiang Zemin officially announced 
the end of PLA economic financing, dismantling the bulk of 
the Chinese MBC and its industries from 20,000 enterprises 
to a mere shadow of less than 1,000 units.2 
 
The Vietnamese MBC regime, which was established in 
1986 by the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP), consisted 
of more than 300 enterprises in the 1990s and was managed 
by the Vietnamese People’s Army (VPA). These included 
businesses such as the Truong Son General Construction 
Corporation, which concentrated, in addition to construction 
projects, on transportation of exported and imported goods, 
and the VPA Special Operations Branch which took part in 
the mining and gem production business.3 Most of these 
industries shrunk in size as the Vietnamese MBC was 
reduced to less than 200 economic units by the early 2000s.  
                                                 
1 James Mulvenon, Soldiers of Fortune: The Rise and Fall of the Chinese 
Military-Business Complex, 1978-1998 (New York, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 
2001), 113, 128-129. 
2 James Mulvenon, Soldiers of Fortune.    
3 Carlyle A. Thayer, The Vietnamese People’s Army Under Doi Moi 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, 1994). 
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In contrast to the Chinese and Vietnamese MBC experiences, 
the Cuban MBC regime is still in place and has grown in 
operation since the early 2000s. The Cuban Revolutionary 
Armed Forces (FAR) managed between 100 to 250 
economic units and industries in the early 1990s. This 
number increased to 1,400 businesses by 2006.
4
 Among 
them, the all important Gaviota S.A., which provides 
services for tourists, and Copextel S.A. which helps produce 
electronic appliances for local use.  
  
The purpose of this paper is to examine why the Cuban MBC 
has continued to expand, while the Chinese and Vietnamese 
MBC regimes have ceased or reduced their economic 
involvements.
5
 It presents the two hypotheses that are 
discussed as possible explanations to the research question. It 
also reviews the data on how each of the hypotheses relates 
to the three MBC case studies. Finally, it summarizes the 
outcomes for each case study and offers a conclusion. 
 
VARIABLES AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Communist Party Variable and Hypothesis 1 (H1) 
The ability of the central communist party to maintain 
control over the military is a crucial factor that determines 
the fate of the MBC regime. Various scholars, however, 
argue that communist-socialist regimes do not have clear 
                                                 
4
 Hal Klepak, Cuba’s Military 1990-2005: Revolutionary Soldiers 
During Counter-Revolutionary Times (New York, NY: Palgrave, 2005).     
5
 This paper answers the research question by looking into the two 
underlined hypotheses. It presents information and data related to the 
differences in party oversight structure over the military, and the 
differences in military political appointees and delegation of power in 
each of the case studies. It should be noted that this paper does not take 
an in depth analysis of the MBC regimes themselves, but merely presents 
how two hypotheses can explain the discrepancies documented with each 
of the three MBC case studies.    
 4 
distinctions between civilian and military institutions, as may 
be the case in democratic governments such as, the United 
States and the European Union.6 This is so because the 
armed forces in communist societies are normally active in 
the political affairs of the local communist party and vice 
versa. This is not to suggest that there is an absence of areas 
where a distinction can be made between party and military, 
but it can be difficult for a researcher to distinguish between 
the two and determine which one is more influential.7 For 
this reason, this study takes into account two control factors 
that are stated to be crucial for a totalitarian authority to 
oversee and maintain a subordinated military. 
 
Samuel P. Huntington points to the first factor in his 
explanation of the term Subjective Civilian Control of the 
military. Subjective control over the military is when a 
civilian faction maximizes its power over the military by not 
allowing the establishment of an autonomous military sphere 
of interest.8 Huntington argues that in this type of civilian 
control in totalitarian regimes rely on interior security 
ministries, or other control instruments, to maintain or coerce 
the armed forces into a subordinate role. In this study these 
control institutions are analyzed for their strength and 
influence within all three MBC regimes. 
 
Amos Perlmutter and William LeoGrande present the second 
factor in the form of “historical legitimacy” within the 
communist party, arguing that the armed forces stay loyal 
and subordinate to the local communist party by respecting 
                                                 
6 Amos Perlmutter and William M. LeoGrande, “The Party in Uniform: 
Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist Political 
Systems,” The American Political Science Review Vol. 76, No. 4 (1982), 
778-89.  
7 Perlmutter and LeoGrande, “The Party in Uniform.” 
8 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and 
Politics of Civil- Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1957), 84-85.    
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its historical legitimacy in society.9 They argue that it is 
important for communist party apparatuses to begin building 
their legitimacy during the time of their formations, which in 
many socialist regimes occurred through violent uprising and 
revolution. During the time of “national revolution,” the 
communist party organization builds a mutually beneficial 
relationship with the armed forces, and establishes itself as 
the leading organizing entity. As such, by the time of 
“revolutionary triumph,” the armed forces see the party as 
the legitimate government.10 Based on this criterion, the 
current investigation conducts a historical analysis of the 
times during which the respective three communist parties 
were established by their party founder, therefore bearing 
evidence on how well each communist party institution was 
able to bring legitimacy on its armed forces. Since this 
historical contrast is derived by Perlmutter and LeoGrande’s 
arguments, Huntington’s criteria of oversight ministries and 
institutions is also taken into account in this section. Thus, 
the hypothesis reads as follows: If the Cuban communist 
central authority does not have institutional control over the 
FAR, and the Chinese and Vietnamese party authorities do 
have control over the PLA and VPA institutions, then this 
variable can account for the discrepancies witnessed in the 
MBC regimes.    
 
Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Variable and Hypothesis 2 
(H2) 
The bureaucratic-authoritarian hypothesis is based on a 
different notion than the communist party hypothesis. It 
encompasses the possibility that some of the MBC countries 
are adapting qualities that go beyond the traditional MBC 
model, and can be more accurately explained with an 
alternative model on military praetorian activity. The 
alternative model that is analyzed is the Bureaucratic-
                                                 
9 Perlmutter and LeoGrande, “The Party in Uniform,” 786. 
10 Perlmutter and LeoGrande, “The Party in Uniform,” 786. 
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Authoritarian (BA) model that was applied to various South 
American military junta governments during the 1960s and 
1970s. 
 
A key element in the BA model is that the military becomes 
the central governing institution by having many military 
officers holding delegated positions of power while not 
dependent on the authority of a single individual.11 The BA 
form of military governance stands apart from other types of 
military rule because of its decentralized nature. For the 
purpose of this study, the BA variable is defined as a 
bureaucratic military leadership, consisting of many military 
officers holding autonomous positions of power and 
authority.  
 
The analysis of this variable and hypothesis is done by 
observing the governing leadership structures of the selected 
case studies during the time of MBC regime existence. This 
involves identifying the key decision-makers of each 
country, and presenting the institutions and delegates 
involved in carrying out economic and political policies. An 
analysis of political leaders and their delegations of authority 
validates whether there is a delegation of power to civilian or 
military officers, and accounts for officers who take active 
decision-making within the economic and political sectors. 
Thus, the hypothesis stipulates that if prominent FAR 
military officials hold independent institutional positions of 
leadership, and such military elites are absent in the PLA and 
VPA cases, this variable might explain the outcomes 
observed in MBC regimes.  
 
 
                                                 
11 David Collier, “The Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model: Synthesis and 
Priorities for Future Research,” in The New Authoritarianism in Latin 
America, edited by David Collier, 363-97 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1979), 368.   
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CHINESE MBC 
 
Communist Party Variable 
The PLA and the CCP were both created in 1927 under the 
communist leadership of Mao Tse-tung. Mao acted as 
supreme leader for both institutions, establishing party 
legitimacy within the armed forces and military obedience to 
his charismatic decision-making.12 By the late 1920s, Mao 
established the political commissar system. Party officers 
began to accompany PLA units and ensure party doctrine in 
military decision-making. However, this triggered resistance 
by field commanders who were fighting the Chinese 
Nationalist Party (KMT) forces in central and eastern China 
during the 1930s. Their main argument was that civilian 
political officers were interfering with decision-making in 
the PLA chain of command. The political officer system was 
removed in 1936, and Chairman Mao ensured that all 
political and military decisions passed through him 
personally. His authority was formally institutionalized in 
1951 with the creation of the Central Military Commission 
(CMC) under the leadership of the CCP.13 
 
The party commissar system was re-introduced in 1958 due 
to cases of criticism from PLA generals and officers. The re-
introduction of the commissar system installed political 
commissars on all branches of the PLA, including the Air 
Force, Navy and regular Army units. The system was later 
partially removed in 1976, yet the need for reliable oversight 
of the PLA was not eliminated. A system of party secretaries 
                                                 
12 Ellis Joffe, “The Chinese Army in Domestic Politics: Factors and 
Phases,” in Chinese Civil-Military Relations: The Transformation of the 
People’s Liberation Army, edited by Nan Li, 7-22 (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2006), 13. 
13 You Ji, “Sorting out the Myths about Political Commissars,” in 
Chinese Civil-Military Relations: The Transformation of the People’s 
Liberation Army, edited by Nan Li (London and New York: Routledge, 
2006), 80-106. 
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was installed under the new leadership of Deng Xiaoping in 
1985. Party secretaries were known to report on PLA actions 
and decision-making to the leadership of the CCP. However, 
they did not have the authority granted to political 
commissars on actively overruling PLA officers and their 
decisions. Authority for overruling military decisions was 
reserved for Chinese leader Deng, the CMC, and by party 
member vote in the Central Committee of the CCP.14  
 
In 1993, President Jiang Zemin, a civilian official, began to 
enforce party secretaries at the provincial level by giving 
them the status of political officers. The new batch of 
commissars was composed of civilian and military 
personnel, ensuring active participation of political 
commissars and secretaries answerable to the CMC and 
preferentially acceptable to both CCP and PLA interests.15 
Such a network of civilian oversight has been prevalent in 
Chinese party-military relations ever since. 
 
BA Model Variable (Military Institutional Rule) 
The communist government of China historically has been 
led by four prominent leaders. The leadership under Mao 
Tse-tung lasted from 1927 to his death in 1976, and involved 
a central form of leadership where Mao was considered head 
of the party and the military, with little or no criticism by 
PLA officers.16 For example, the re-installation of the 
political commissar system in 1956 and the removal of 
Minister of Defense Peng Dehuai in 1958 were both 
accepted by the PLA with limited criticism.17 Mao was also 
hesitant in delegating authority to any of his subordinates, 
and he constantly warned over having too much bureaucracy 
                                                 
14 Ji, “Sorting out the Myths about Political Commissars.” 
15 Ji, “Sorting out the Myths about Political Commissars,” 94-95. 
16 Joffe, “The Chinese Army in Domestic Politics.” 
17 Ibid. 13. 
 9 
and decentralization of power.18 He did possess an entourage 
of trusted advisors whom he appointed to various positions 
within the CCP and the CMC. By serving as chairman of 
both the CCP and the CMC, Mao ensured that his network of 
advisors would keep him updated on all PLA decisions, thus 
ensuring his centrality in both institutions with limited 
delegated authority.19 
 
Mao’s successor, Deng Xiaoping, also employed a network 
of party and military advisors that ensured his leadership, 
most notably CMC Vice-Chair Yang Shangkun. Deng was 
able to solidify his power between 1976 and 1978 by purging 
the pro-Maoist “Gang of Four” and Mao’s former wife Jiang 
Qing.20 Like Mao, Deng was also considered a centralist 
military authority and all major decisions were enacted by 
him with little delegation of authority. Advisors such as 
Yang helped to ensure his rule in the PLA institution, yet 
Deng was considered the sole authority during his time in 
power and the PLA officer’s core remained overall loyal to 
his persona despite criticism by some military officers when 
he ordered the PLA to begin its business endeavors in the 
early 1980s.21  
 
Deng’s leadership lasted until 1994, when he disappeared 
from public life. Jiang Zemin, former chairman of the 
                                                 
18 Arthur S. Banks, Thomas C. Muller, and William R. Overstreet, 
Political Handbook of the World 2008. (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 
2008). 
19 Ji, “Sorting out the Myths about Political Commissars,” 13-14. 
20 Banks, et al., Political Handbook of the World 2008, 249-250. 
21 James Mulvenon argues that in the 1980s, Deng began to institute 
economic reforms, saving costs on the central national budget. These 
new economic policies included severely diminishing the national 
defense budget and cutting the number of active regular PLA troops. To 
offset the diminishing defense budget, Deng ordered the PLA to increase 
their economic activities, thus ushering in the beginning of the Chinese 
MBC (2001).  
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CMC,22 was named as his successor. Jiang’s rise to power in 
the mid-1990s symbolized a shift in Chinese leadership and 
military management. Apart from Mao and Deng, who had 
strong roots within the PLA, Jiang was a civilian leader with 
no military experience and limited charismatic appeal. His 
leadership strengthened institutions, such as the CCP and the 
CMC, instead of falling back on charismatic legitimacy 
evident in his two predecessors,23 This was done by 
replacing older civilian and military officers who were 
deemed by Jiang as too independent and threatening to his 
rule with younger officials that supported his rule.24 
 
Jiang’s policies were then followed by President Hu Jintao in 
the early 2000s. Hu was also a civilian party official with 
limited military legitimacy, and relied on strong institutions 
to ensure his rule. This included replacing pro-Jiang civilian 
and military officials with those more loyal to him, a move 
that eventually lead to the removal of former President 
Jiang25 in 2005 from the CMC chairman position, a position 
that Hu then took for himself.26 
 
Presidents Hu and Jiang were not the central charismatic 
leaders seen in Mao and Deng. They were more bureaucratic 
in nature, as both of them relied on institutional strength 
from the CCP and the CMC. Yet, none of these four leaders, 
including Mao and Deng, delegated authority to military 
                                                 
22 Jiang was the first known civilian chair of the CMC. He obtained such 
a position when Deng Xiaoping relinquished his formal title of Chair of 
the CMC. After which, Deng possessed informal rule of the CMC, and 
was still recognized as China’s supreme leader (Banks et al., Political 
Handbook of the World 2008, 252)  
23 Joffe, “The Chinese Army in Domestic Politics,” 15-17. 
24 Ibid. 100. 
25 President Jiang retained his post of chairman of the CMC after he 
relinquished the presidency in the year 2003 (Joffe, “The Chinese Army 
in Domestic Politics,” 16-17).  
26 Joffe, “The Chinese Army in Domestic Politics,” 17. 
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leaders to the point seen in BA regimes. They each possessed 
their circle of advisors and in the case of Presidents Hu and 
Jiang, a decentralization of institutional authority did occur, 
seen in the empowered institutions of the CCP and the 
CMC.27 Yet, these examples are based more on a civilian 
bureaucratic authority, and do not match the BA regime form 
of military delegate authority.  
 
THE VIETNAMESE MBC 
 
Communist Party Variable 
The VPA was created in 1944 by party leader Ho Chi Minh 
as a parallel institution to the Indochinese Communist Party 
(ICP). Ho saw the need to train and rally Vietnamese 
nationalists to help unify the nation, which would contend 
with Japanese imperialism in the 1940s and French 
colonialism in the 1950s. It was first composed of 
approximately 500 fighters in 1945, but grew to more than 
10,000 troops by the mid-1950s.28 
 
The Vietnamese Communist Party first began as the ICP in 
1944 under Ho’s leadership.  It was then renamed the 
Vietnamese Workers’ Party (VWP) in 1954 and then the 
Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) in 1976 as the official 
government party of the newly unified Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam (SRV).29 During its initial years, the party mostly 
followed the decisions employed by leader Ho. Ho 
surrounded himself with individuals who had dual roles in 
forming the communist party apparatus and the Vietnamese 
military institution. These dual role personnel ensured 
                                                 
27 Ibid. 
28 Thaveeporn Vasavakul,“Vietnam: From Revolutionary Heroes to Red 
Entrepreneurs,” in Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political 
Role of the Military in South Asia, edited by Muthiah Alagappa 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 336-56. 
29 Banks, et al., Political Handbook of the World 2008, 1477. 
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parallel military and party compliance, as well as party 
historical legitimacy over the armed forces. Ho’s early 
proclamation in 1944 of the Vietnamese revolution as a 
socialist revolution under the leadership of the ICP also 
ensured party historical legitimacy in the VPA military 
institution.30 
 
After defeating France in the 1950s and the U.S. in the 
1970s, certain institutions were installed to help manage the 
VPA, which by then was composed of almost 2 million 
soldiers. The Central Military Party Committee (CMPC) was 
established in 1985 and was the latest institution of a long 
line of preceding party institutions.31 The CMPC was the 
main liaison institution that ensured party commissars within 
the VPA followed party decisions and policies. It also kept 
tabs and records of military personnel that were party 
members to enforce party compliance by military officials.32 
The CMPC mandate was later expanded to include oversight 
of the Vietnamese MBC. It enforced two separate party 
reforms which led to the gradual diminishment of the 
Vietnamese MBC, and were severely criticized by VPA 
military leaders.33 
 
The Vietnamese party oversight system has kept strong 
controls on the VPA military apparatus; however, this 
system has not exempted the VCP from military criticism. 
Various VPA generals and officers, including former 
Secretary Lt. General Le Kha Phieu, openly criticized the 
party in the preceding months of the 1996 party congress. In 
                                                 
30 Vasavakul, “Vietnam,” 341. 
31Ibid. 
32 Vasavakul, “Vietnam,” 341-344. 
33 Carlyle Thayer, “The Economic and Commercial Roles of the 
Vietnamese People’s Army,” in The Military as an Economic Actor, 
edited by Jorn Brommelhorster, and Wolf-Christian Paes, 74-93 (New 
York: Palgrave, 2003), 89-92. 
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his address over the Hanoi National Radio Network, 
Secretary Le openly stated that the VCP needed to increase 
training of raw young recruits within the armed forces. He 
also criticized the party for failing to make industrialization 
and economic modernization more of a national priority in 
the 1990s.34 General Dao Dinh Luyen, a long-standing 
member of the Party Military Committee, also criticized the 
party. Dao stated that the VCP was failing to meet the 
requirements needed to improve industrialization, 
technological advancement and national defense.35 
 
The Vietnamese military institution has at times openly 
criticized the local communist authority, yet these acts of 
resistance have been limited. History shows that the VPA 
has been unable to prevent party action in containing 
independent military decision-making. An example of this is 
seen with the removal of Lt. General Le Kha Phieu as party 
secretary in the early 2000, which was criticized but 
otherwise accepted by the VPA leadership.36    
 
BA Model Variable (Military Institutional Rule) 
As established, the VCP was formed in 1944 as the 
Indochinese Communist Party by Ho Chi Minh and his circle 
of civilian and military leaders. All of these individuals 
played a part in carrying out party and military policy, yet 
the central authority figure that governed the Vietnamese 
nation was the charismatic party leader Ho Chi Minh.37 Ho 
was the founder of the ICP and the Vietminh socialist 
                                                 
34 Lewis Stern, The Vietnamese Communist Party’s Agenda for Reform: 
A Study of the Eight National Party Congress (London: McFarland & 
Company, Inc, Publishers, 1998), 41. 
35 Ibid., 42. 
36 Vasavakul, “Vietnam,” 351. 
37 Ibid. 
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movement, and all party and military authority was centered 
on his persona with limited delegation of power.38 
 
Ho’s death in 1969 brought the de facto-leadership of 
General Secretary Le Duan39 until the formation of the SRV 
in 1976, which then brought the authority of President Ton 
Duc Thang as the official leader of the SRV.40 Vietnam came 
under the rule of various leaders after President Ton’s death 
in 1980, yet the SRV was basically run by the VCP. The 
presidents and political leaders that came after 1980, 
Presidents Nguyen Huu Tho, Trung Chinh and Vo Chi Cong, 
were all characterized as non-charismatic and non-military 
leaders. These leaders mainly focused on strengthening the 
bureaucracy of the VCP, which included the formation of the 
CMPC in 1985. Consequently, during the time of these 
presidencies, Vietnamese governance was carried out by the 
party and civilian institutions with little or no delegation of 
power to military officers. 
 
It was not until 1992 that Vietnam came under the 
presidency of its first military leader, retired General Le Duc 
Anh. Up to this point Vietnam was mainly ruled by the VCP 
and its civilian institutions.41 The Vietnamese MBC first 
began to take hold in 1986, yet it was under President Le’s 
leadership that it grew to more than 300 industries. Under 
Le’s presidency, the most prominent military member that 
rose to a high position of power was Lt. General Le Kha 
Phieu. General Le was named as Party Secretary and was 
one of the strongest supporters of increasing the Vietnamese 
MBC. Yet after President Le Duc Anh resigned in 1997, 
                                                 
38 Banks, et al., Political Handbook of the World 2008,1478-1479. 
39 The post of President and Party Leader was left vacant until 1976 as a 
sign of respect to Ho Chi Minh’s leadership (Banks et al., Political 
Handbook of the World 2008, 1478). 
40 Banks, et al., Political Handbook of the World 2008. 
41 Banks, et al. Political Handbook of the World 2008. 
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General Le was eventually removed from office in 2001 and 
Vietnam was again under civilian rule.42 The only 
resemblance of BA model military authority was with the 
tenure of both of these officers between 1992 and 2001. Yet 
these two examples of military decentralized leadership 
within the Vietnamese MBC do not conform to the BA 
variable definition of multiple military officers holding 
autonomous positions of power. Furthermore, even during 
the time of military President Le Duc Anh, Vietnam was still 
centrally governed by the civilian communist party, and the 
appointments of these two officers did not stop the two 
economic reforms that were enacted by the CMPC in 1995 
and 1997 to gradually reduce the Vietnamese MBC.  
 
CUBAN MBC 
 
Communist Party Variable 
The Cuban Communist Party (PCC) was officially created in 
1965, but according to LeoGrande, was not considered a 
strong reliable governing organization until the early 1970s. 
The FAR was created in 1961, yet its personnel and staff 
were already organized under the leadership of Fidel and 
Raúl Castro in 1957. This lapse of time ensured a party 
military spectrum that consisted of a newly created 
communist party organization contending with an already 
established legitimate military institution.43  
 
In 1961, then President Fidel Castro ordered the creation of 
the Central School of Revolutionary Instructors. It was 
created to train a set of instructors to help politically educate 
FAR military units, a move that was part of Fidel Castro’s 
                                                 
42 Vasavakul, “Vietnam,” 351-352. 
43 William M. LeoGrande, “A Bureaucratic Approach to Civil-Military 
Relations in Communist Political Systems: The Case of Cuba,” in Civil-
Military Relations in Communist Systems, edited by Dale R. Herspring 
and Ivan Volgyes (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), 201-18. 
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pronouncement of the Cuban revolution as a socialist 
revolution. With this pronouncement, Fidel saw the need to 
make sure that the military remained loyal to his regime. 
Between the years of 1959-1962, the only mechanism of 
civilian control over the military was the loyalty of the FAR 
forces to Castro himself,44 and the counterweight offered by 
the National Revolutionary Militias composed of irregular 
civilians.45 Yet, the establishment of revolutionary 
instructors, who were later referred to as political instructors, 
offered the Castro leadership a more sophisticated institution 
to maintain civilian control of the FAR.  
 
By 1963, the drawbacks and overall failures of installing 
political controls on the FAR became evident. Cuban 
military officers immediately criticized the use of political 
officers, arguing that they did not have any knowledge or 
experience in military governing methods and were an 
impediment in military fighting effectiveness. With the Bay 
of Pigs Invasion (1961) and the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), 
the Castro leadership appeased FAR officers by restructuring 
the training parameters of political officers. Consequently, 
from 1963 to 1970, political officers were strictly limited to 
act as a supportive role to the military. This included taking 
direct orders from FAR officers in their respective military 
units.46  
 
                                                 
44 Edward Gonzáles documents this charismatic element with his 
Fidelismo model, which presents a charismatic leader holding complete 
central authority in every single component of governance, as such not 
relying on any decentralized bureaucratic political institution (Edward 
Gonzáles, Cuba Under Castro: The Limits of Charisma (Los Angeles: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1974), 218-221.   
45 LeoGrande, “A Bureaucratic Approach to Civil-Military Relations in 
Communist Political Systems,” 206. 
46 LeoGrande, “A Bureaucratic Approach to Civil-Military Relations in 
Communist Political Systems,” 207-210. 
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A similar outcome occurred with the creation of the PCC in 
1965. Military officers believed that such bureaucratic 
intervention would impede the FAR’s administrative 
mandate. Such conflict of interest was voiced by then 
Minister of Defense Raúl Castro in 1966, who eventually 
proclaimed that there was widespread resistance by FAR 
officers in accepting PCC command. Because of favoritism, 
and the overall prestige of the military, the PCC was 
unofficially recognized as a supportive arm and tool of the 
FAR during the formative years, between 1965 and 1970.47 
During this time, as the inner departments of the PCC were 
organized and consolidated, FAR officers held almost 
complete decision-making in selecting party central 
committee members; moreover, criticism of FAR officers by 
party members was completely banned during party 
meetings. Thus, in the formative years of the PCC, the 
Cuban communist party was completely subordinated to the 
FAR military institution.48  
 
It was not until the 1970s that the PCC began to increase its 
control and influence as a governing institution, in large part 
due to the political pressure from the Soviet Union on the 
Castro leadership and the overall failure of the 10 million 
tons grain harvest to live up to expectations under the mostly 
military-administrated economic policies. By 1974, the FAR 
position of privilege in non-military tasks was decreasing, 
and the Cuban party-military spectrum began to resemble the 
typical communist regimes seen in Russia, Asia and Eastern 
Europe. However, they quickly reverted back to a similar 
scenario of the 1960s as a reaction to the emerging 
Gorbachev reforms of the 1980s, and the eventual collapse 
of the Soviet Union in 1989.49 In the 1990s, the Castro 
                                                 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Juan Carlos Espinosa, “Vanguard of the State: The Cuban Armed 
Forces in Transition,” in Cuban Communism: 1959-2003, edited by 
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regime augmented the FAR’s hold on power by increasing 
its economic and political influence by transferring economic 
and political institutions from PCC jurisdiction to FAR 
management.50  
 
The most famous case regarding the transfer of power 
occurred with the Ministry of Interior (MININT), the main 
domestic security institution in Cuba.51 In 1989, with the 
sacking of MININT director José Abrantes, FAR General 
Abelardo Ibarra became head Minister of MININT. This led 
to a change in MININT’s operations and procedures, 
including FAR participation in security decision-making, 
inability to investigate FAR officers without prior military 
approval, and stationing of FAR personnel in security tasks 
such as interrogations, drug enforcement and crime 
investigations.52 The one institution that could have offered 
oversight to the FAR began to be heavily hindered in 
military oversight operations.53  
 
BA Model Variable (Military Institutional Rule) 
Since 1959 the Cuban leadership structure has always been 
centered on Fidel and Raúl Castro. As was the case with 
Chairman Mao Tse-tung in 1949 China and party leader Ho 
Chi Minh in 1965 Vietnam, Fidel Castro proclaimed himself 
as the sole charismatic decision-maker. According to 
                                                                                                    
Irving Louis Horowitz and Jaime Suchlicki (New Brunswick and 
London: Transaction Publishers, 2003) 366-87. 
50 Ibid.  
51 Brian Latell, After Fidel: Raul Castro and the Future of Cuba’s 
Revolution (New York: Palgrave, 2005).  
52 Juan Antonio Rodríguez, Cuba Por Dentro: El MININT (Miami: 
Ediciones Universal, 1996), 42-29. 
53 For more information on the jurisdictional transfer of MININT to FAR 
control, including its relation to the important events of the execution of 
General Arnaldo Ochoa and the arrest of Director José Abrantes, Colonel 
Antonio de la Guardia and his brother, see After Fidel: Raul Castro and 
the Future of Cuba’s Revolution (Latell).   
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interviews from defected Cuban officials, Fidel himself 
admitted his deep antipathy for bureaucracies and committee 
forms of government. He was known to have an inner circle 
of ten civilian and military advisors, which he would use to 
obtain advice and recommendation and then make his final 
decision with no delegation of authority.54 This was the main 
characterization of Cuban governance from 1959 to 2006.  
 
Raúl Castro, in contrast to his brother, is considered to lack 
charisma, assertiveness and prestige within the Cuban 
context.55 As such, Raúl’s leadership has been characterized 
as delegating power to loyal military officers from his time 
as Minister of Defense. Such officers include General 
Ramiro Valdés56 who was former head of the Ministry of 
Interior in the 1960s and now heads FAR Corporation 
Copextel S.A, former Minister of Defense General Julio 
Casas Regueiro who up to his death in 2011, was a key 
player in managing the all important GAESA S.A. 
organization, and finally General Abelardo Ibarra, who 
currently heads the Ministry of Interior and is considered one 
of Raul’s trusted colleagues.57 
 
Other important FAR appointments to government ministries 
include General Ulises Rosales del Toro, head of the 
Ministry of Sugar Industry, Colonel Manuel Marrero, head 
of the Ministry of Tourism, General Carlos Fernández 
Gondin, head of the FAR counterintelligence and vice 
minister of MININT, Colonel Álvaro Pérez Morales, former 
head of Ministry of Transport and Ports, and Colonel 
                                                 
54 Anthony P. Maingot, “The Inevitable Transition: From Charismatic to 
Military-Bureaucratic Authority in Cuba,” Cuban Research Institute. 
Report No. 3. Miami: Florida International University. 2007: p.8-9.   
55 Ibid. 12-13.   
56 It should be noted, however, that Valdés was considered in the late 
1980s as a potential rival to Raúl Castro. As such, his loyalties are stated 
to be more inclined toward Fidel than Raúl (Latell, After Fidel. 221). 
57 Latell, After Fidel, 242 
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Orlando Rodríguez Romay, former head of Ministry of 
Fisheries and Merchant Marine.58 These appointments 
represent the independent military-political element within 
the Cuban government. This institutional form of military 
economic and political management is an evolving 
phenomenon that closely resembles the appointments and 
delegations of power seen in BA regimes. 
 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
 
Communist Party Analysis 
According to Huntington, Perlmutter and LeoGrande, 
totalitarian states ensure civilian control with their governing 
historical legitimacy, and with the use of security institutions 
to influence military decision making. The Chinese and 
Vietnamese communist institutions were both created on a 
parallel platform with their armed forces, and they both were 
given executive rights, through their charismatic party 
founders, to oversee their respective military institutions. 
Apart from isolated cases of military personnel criticizing 
party governance, the Chinese and Vietnamese military 
institutions as a whole recognized and followed orders early 
on from their respective communist parties.59 Thus, both the 
Chinese and Vietnamese party organizations possess 
historical legitimacy within their party-military spectrums.   
 
The Cuban case presents a different example, where the FAR 
military institution predates the PCC by several years. The 
FAR was the main working institution in the 1960s, and was 
the main managerial agent that took charge of rebuilding 
Cuban society after the revolutionary war of 1957-1959.60 
                                                 
58 Domingo Amuchástegui, “FAR: Mastering Reform,” Cuba in 
Transition, Vol. 10 (2000), 433-41.    
59 Thayer, “The Economic and Commercial Roles of the Vietnamese 
People’s Army.” 
60 Espinosa, “Vanguard of the State.” 
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By the time the PCC was created in 1965, it had to contend 
with an established military governing regime, which 
severely limited historical party legitimacy. Lack of 
historical legitimacy is clearly seen as FAR commanders had 
almost complete authority to control party committee 
membership, party schedule and meetings, and inner 
investigations on FAR personnel.61 Hence, the Cuban case 
study does not follow with Perlmutter and LeoGrande’s 
argument of historical legitimacy.      
 
The argument of security institutions is also a fact to explain 
in this analysis. During and after the initial years of socialist 
revolution, the CCP and the VCP installed a network of 
oversight institutions on the PLA and VPA military 
establishments. Despite initial resistance by army officers in 
the 1930s, the CCP installed a dual system of political 
commissars and political secretaries who answered to the 
Chinese president, the CCP, and the CMC institution. It was 
this institutional network that enabled the diminishment of 
the PLA economic involvement in 1998.62 The Vietnamese, 
likewise, installed a similar chain of institutions which 
specifically answered to the CMPC. The institutional rule of 
the VCP and the CMPC ensured two waves of reforms in the 
Vietnamese MBC, which resulted in its diminishment.     
 
In the Cuban example, the attempt at installing political 
officers in the ranks of the FAR was met with overall failure 
in the 1960s. Despite the success by the PCC after 1974 in 
becoming a legitimate institution, the economic crisis of the 
1980s and 1990s led the FAR to once again act as a power 
broker above the PCC. Party weakness in overseeing the 
FAR also became evident when the Ministry of Interior was 
                                                 
61 LeoGrande, “A Bureaucratic Approach to Civil-Military Relations in 
Communist Political Systems,” 206. 
62 Mulvenon, Soldiers of Fortune. 
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transferred to military jurisdiction in 1989, preventing strong 
party oversight on the Cuban armed forces.63   
 
The Chinese and Vietnamese case studies meet Huntington’s 
benchmark of security oversight institutions as these two 
communist parties maintained control of their respective 
militaries. The Cuban example, however, does not meet this 
argument on the grounds that the FAR has historically 
overruled PCC control, and presently controls the main 
security institution that could offer party oversight. Thus, the 
Cuban party-military spectrum does not meet either the 
Huntington, or the Perlmutter and LeoGrande benchmark 
points used to determine the level of party control over the 
military. As such, the communist party hypothesis fits the 
comparative model underlined in this study, as being a 
possible reason for the research question.  
 
BA Model – Military Institutional Rule Analysis      
One of the prime BA characteristics is that power and 
decision-making are spread out and decentralized across a 
wide range of military actors.64 The Chinese MBC began 
under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, a legitimate PLA 
figure and rival to Mao Tse-tung. Deng was the official chair 
of the CMC from 1978-1989. He took active decision 
making in the CMC and CCP, and relied on the presence of 
loyalist such as Yang Shangkun to ensure his authority 
within the all government institutions.65 In the Vietnamese 
case, military President Le Duc Anh and the appointment of 
Lt. General Le Kha Phieu as Party Secretary ensured a 
limited bureaucratic presence of military interest. Le was 
known to have his own sphere of authority during his time as 
party secretary.66 Yet, these examples of Vietnamese and 
                                                 
63 Rodríguez, Cuba Por Dentro. 
64 Collier, “The Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model.” 
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Chinese military delegation of authority are limited. They do 
not compare to the various military appointees seen in the 
Cuban examples, which involved many high-level FAR 
generals obtaining political positions, in addition to 
economic assignments. These included, for example, key 
sectors such as domestic security (Ministry of Interior), 
agriculture (Ministry of Agriculture) and tourism (Ministry 
of Tourism). Thus, the BA hypothesis is a prime reason for 
as to why the Cuban MBC is able to expand in contrast to the 
Chinese’s and Vietnamese’s MBC contractions.   
 
CONCLUSION  
 
The overall conclusion of this study is that the Cuban MBC 
has increased because the FAR is gradually becoming the 
most prominent institution to manage the Cuban economy 
and government. The Chinese and Vietnamese MBC regimes 
have decreased mostly because both the PLA and the VPA 
have to contend and coexist with an equally strong and 
influential party apparatus that limits the economic spheres 
of military interest. The FAR does not contend as much with 
a party apparatus, but influences and uses the party as a 
political tool.       
 
It is important to understand that the communist party and 
BA hypotheses are interconnected. The fact that the Cuban 
Communist Party does not possess a reliable oversight 
mechanism over the FAR is a clear catalyst for the rise of 
FAR generals to key government positions. The rise of a 
bureaucratic FAR institution is then a result of a power 
vacuum left by an underdevelopment of party institutions. 
This argument is comparatively corroborated by looking at 
the Chinese and Vietnamese MBC counterparts, which 
possess a heavy involvement of party institutions, such as the 
Chinese CMC and the Vietnamese CMPC, and prevent 
complete independence by military officers. The fact that the 
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Ministry of Interior, the strongest Cuban institution capable 
of overseeing the Cuban MBC, was shifted to FAR 
jurisdiction in 1989 suggests that coordinated civilian 
oversight over the military enterprises is non-existent.  
 
It must be clarified that this study does not conclude that the 
Chinese and Vietnamese militaries are completely 
subservient to general party authority. One must recall the 
historical cases of military resistance and criticism of party 
leaders in both of these countries. Many scholars label this as 
“Conditional Compliance” within communist regimes.67 
Communist parties will respect military autonomous spheres 
of interest in which the military is more equipped and 
capable to handle: i.e. national defense and domestic 
security. In return, the military will respect party, and 
ultimately civilian, fields of interests such as economic and 
social development. This form of party-military relation is 
evident in the Chinese and Vietnamese examples, which 
consist of the communist party and the military 
simultaneously competing and coexisting with one another.68 
Such a relation is not evident in the Cuban example, as the 
communist party acts as the supportive tool for the military. 
  
These are the scenarios that have emerged in the three case 
studies, and may explain why military-economic 
involvements expand and contract. When there is a rival 
civilian institution that can offer oversight over the military, 
then military-economic involvement will probably decrease 
or hold stagnant. However, a gap in civilian control over the 
military coupled with a legitimate bureaucratic military 
entity can lead to an increase in military-economic 
involvement. 
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This can help present a clearer picture and understanding of 
the domestic and foreign policy decisions enacted by 
regimes that possess highly influential economic-military 
institution.   
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